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Introduction
It’s not often you hear or read this combination of words in the same sentence but surely this
year’s summit meeting of the Group of 8 (G8) leaders will be etched on people’s memories for
generations to come. Nobody could have predicted the cataclysmic events that unfolded on
the northernmost island of Japan in the summer of 2008: the city of Sapporo attacked by the
vengeful space monster Guilala; the leaders of the G8 countries united in their efforts to
destroy the creature; former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro ended recent speculation and
returned to take over the reigns of power in a time of crises; and the G8 leaders taken hostage
by Kim Jong-Il. For an annual diplomatic event that is often portrayed as little more than a
meaningless ceremony, this has to have been one of the most unforgettable summits in its
thirty-three history. At least that’s what happened if you only watched the highly amusing
monster movie Girara no GyakushÅ«: Toyako Samitto Kiki Ippatsu (Guilala Strikes Back:
Crisis at the Lake Toya Summit) premiered in Hokkaido the weekend before the G8 summit
began.
Guilala Strikes Back!
In mundane reality, Japan hosted the thirty-fourth G8 summit from 7 to 9 July 2008 and it
would have probably taken events of the magnitude described above for the world’s press to
have given the G8 summit serious attention. Most media depictions of the G8 are sadly
predictable to the degree that the reports for next year’s summits could probably be copied
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and pasted now. They tend to fall into one of two camps: it is either an evil behemoth of global
capitalism irresistibly crushing all under foot, rather like Guilala did to Sapporo, or it is
regarded as an impotent, anachronistic and irrelevant talking shop at which what the leaders
ate at dinner gets more press attention than their discussions and declarations. In fact, it is
something different altogether, something that does not lend itself to quick fixes, easy
soundbites and simplistic characterisations, but as the two depictions above have become
the mainstream of media reporting on the G8, enquiring minds have to go out of their way to
locate more nuanced and contextualised understandings of the G8. If they do, then it
becomes clear that the G8 summit is a flexible and informal get-together of like-minded
leaders (and Russia) for the creation of consensus on how to address common problems. It
reaches this consensus incrementally over time and in an ad hoc fashion. Furthermore, not
being a legal entity, it lacks the means and the legitimacy to force through any agreements
reached. Instead, the G8 should be understood as part of a long-term process stretching back
to the mid-1970s. It is a think tank where ideas can be floated and agreements struck. It can
then prod, poke and encourage individual governments or the legitimate institutions of global
governance like the United Nations to take action. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t,
but what the G8 represents is a unique forum in world politics and expectant journalists
attempting to file stories of major breakthroughs are going to be naturally disappointed. In this
light, Japan hosted, once again, a moderately successful summit that was something of a
curate’s egg – good in parts. In a number of ways, this year’s summit can be seen as an
incremental step in various directions from policy outcomes to the way in which the G8
leaders meet.
Bishop: “I’m afraid you’ve got a bad egg, Mr Jones”
Curate: “Oh, no, my Lord, I assure you that parts of it are excellent!”
”True Humility” by George du Maurier, originally published in Punch, 1895.
The G8 in 2008
First of all, to place this year’s summit in some kind of context. The G8 leaders first met as a
G6 at the chateau of Rambouillet in November 1975. This year was the fifth time for Japan to
host the summit with previous summits taking place in Tokyo (1979, 1986 and 1993) and
Okinawa (2000). The Windsor Hotel served as the comfortable venue, selected by former
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo largely for security reasons, although Hokkaido had been
pencilled in as the summit venue as early as the previous 2000 Okinawa Summit. The
management of the hotel is seen to be a recent success story, having been a product, and
later victim of, Japan’s bubble economy.
This year’s summit was hosted by Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and attended by Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, French President
Nicolas Sarkozy, US President George W. Bush, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and President of the
European Commission José Manuel Barroso. Each leader was accompanied by a top
bureaucrat, known as the sherpa, whose job was to guide their respective leaders to the
summit of international diplomacy. This year Kono Masaharu, Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs, served as Fukuda’s sherpa.
In keeping with the G8 as a process, the summit of the leaders was preceded by a string of
ministerial meetings throughout the year. These included Development Ministers (5-6 April,
Tokyo), Labour Ministers (11-13 May, Niigata), Environment Ministers (24-26 May, Kobe),
Energy Ministers (7-8 June, Aomori), Justice and Home Affairs Ministers (11-13 June, Tokyo),
Finance Ministers (13-14 June, Osaka), G8 Science and Technology Ministers (15 June,
Okinawa), and Foreign Ministers (26-27 June, Kyoto). Although not part of the G8 process, the
Japanese government used its presidency of the G8 summit to draw a link to the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) that was held from 28-30 May in
Yokohama. There was even an old boys’ summit (known formally as the InterAction Council
and founded by the Prime Minster Fukuda Takeo in 1983) that took place in Sweden at the
end of June and at which former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro represented Japan.
The summit schedule was spread over three days. On the first day, 7 July, the G8 leaders
were joined by a number of African outreach partners a part of a process that was begun by
the Japanese government at the previous summit it hosted in Okinawa in July 2000. The
following day, 8 July, was the only time allocated solely for the G8 leaders to discuss a range
of political, economic and security issues. The final day, 9 July, began with a working session
of the G8 and the ‘Outreach Five’ (Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, who have
cast themselves as the more positively titled G5), joined later in the day by the other major
economies/emitters of South Korea, Indonesia and Australia to discuss climate change.
During these three days and across the whole year of Japan’s chairmanship of the G8, a
number of trends of relevance to both Japan, the G8 and the world can be discerned, which
will be discussed below.
One final contextual but slightly tangential point: recent G8 summits have been distinct by the
consistency in the attendance of their personnel. Tony Blair, Bush, Jacques Chirac, Koizumi
and Gerhard Schroeder were regular summiteers who could use the informality of these
annual gatherings at the G8 to reinforce their interpersonal relationships. This was, after all,
one of the original intentions of the summit process. For example, it was the G8 where the
leaders came together after the divisions of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, and in response
to the London bombings of July 2005, again the G8 leaders bonded. However, this year many
of the leaders were either first-timers or had little experience of the summit: Brown, Medvedev
and Fukuda were all attending the summit for the first time; Sarkozy for the second time; and
Harper and Merkel for the third time. The most senior summiteer turned out to be Bush
attending his eighth and final summit. Moreover, all this year’s summiteers shared an
unstable political position at home. The leaders were either hugely unpopular (Brown,
Fukuda and Sarkozy), lame ducks (Bush), cat’s paws (Medvedev), or domestically weakened
by their position within minority governments or coalition governments (Harper and Merkel).
Although lack of summit experience and the domestic weakness of the leaders hasn’t
stopped the summiteers reaching important agreements in the past, such as that struck at the
eleventh hour at the 1979 Tokyo Summit on oil consumption targets, expectations were not
high in advance of this year’s summit.
A Curate’s Egg
As regards substantive agenda items, attention was firmly focused on climate change and
African development. Focusing on the former issue was partly continuing the momentum
created at the previous year’s summit at Heiligendamm and partly a result of Fukuda placing
it on the agenda at a very early stage when he spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos
in January. This was then promoted in the media as the ‘Fukuda Vision’  centred on pledging
to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 60 per cent to 80 per cent by 2050 from current levels,
although prospects of having this adopted by his fellow summiteers were bleak – even more
so as regards the adoption of any mid-term targets for 2020. Inviting a number of developing
countries and major emitters to participate in the discussions was a necessary step but also
made the chances of reaching any agreement even slimmer.
Eventually, commitment was made to achieving at least 50 per cent reduction in emissions by
2050:
We seek to share with all Parties to the UNFCCC the vision of, and together with
them to consider and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving
at least 50 per cent reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognizing that this
global challenge can only be met by a global response, in particular, by the
contributions from all major economies, consistent with the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Comparing this with the statements made at the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, incremental
progress is clear from serious consideration to actual action and targets:
In setting a global goal for emissions reductions in the process we have agreed
in Heiligendamm involving all major emitters, we will consider seriously the
decisions made by the European Union, Canada and Japan which include at
least a halving of global emissions by 2050. We have agreed that the UN
climate process is the appropriate forum for negotiating future global action on
climate change.
On the minus side of the ledger, the language used in summit statements is notoriously vague
as it tends to be the result of compromise so what ‘seek and share’, ‘consider and adopt’
concretely amount to is unclear. What is more, there was some disparity between the English
and Japanese translations of the above declaration with a stronger and clearer commitment
implied in the Japanese version. Equally, there was no agreement on mid-term targets or
consensus on baseline years and it is debatable how beholden G8 (or whatever forum may
still be meeting) leaders will be to agreements made 42 years previously. On the plus side of
the ledger, the US agreed for the first time at Toyako to concrete targets to cut emissions. In
addition, the incremental and iterative fashion in which the G8 functions is clear: the leaders
shifted from agreeing in 2007 to seriously consider a 50 per cent cut by 2050 to pledging a
year later to promote the initiative within the UNFCCC negotiations. Another important aspect
of these statements is the reference to the United Nations. The G8 leaders knowing the extent
of their influence and abilities, instead recognized and reinforced the UNFCCC as the most
appropriate and effective mechanism of addressing a global problem of this nature. So, very
much a curate’s egg.
This year Japan was also hosting the TICAD IV meeting in Yokohama and in fact brought the
meeting forward to create a stronger link with the G8 so that the Japanese government could
present Africa’s concerns to the G8 leaders. Amongst a wide range of commitments and
declarations related to African development and security, as regards the specific issue of the
amount of aid promised by the G8 at Gleneagles in 2005, the Toyako Statement on
Development and Africa declared that:
We are firmly committed to working to fulfill our commitments on ODA made at
Gleneagles, and reaffirmed at Heiligendamm, including increasing, compared
to 2004, with other donors, ODA to Africa by US$25 billion a year by 2010. We
commend the successful replenishments of the resources of the International
Development Association, the African Development Fund and the Asian
Development Fund in which G8 countries provided nearly 75 per cent of
donor's contributions and we acknowledge that ODA from G8 and other donors
to Africa should be reassessed and may need to be increased for the period
after 2010, beyond our current commitments.
In short, the key year is 2010 when the summit will be held in Canada. Looking ahead to that
target and under considerable pressure from NGO groups, the G8 reworked its declaration at
the last minute to reaffirm the original Gleneagles pledge, reinstate the concrete figures and
encourage compliance so that they meet their targets, toward which some members are sadly
lagging behind. The expectation is that next year’s Italian summit will push forward the
discussion of what will be agreed post-2010, highlighted in the above statement. Again,
something of a mixed bag.
Zimbabwe was an issue that elbowed its way onto the G8’s agenda as a result of a run-off
presidential election less than a fortnight before the summit began that was characterised by
intimidation and the withdrawal of opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Zimbabwe had been
discussed at the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kyoto before the Toyako Summit and was
then addressed in a dedicated statement by the G8 leaders. They condemned the
government of Robert Mugabe, called for the original election results to be upheld and
threatened the imposition of financial sanctions, a step the G7 took previously at the 1989
Paris Summit against China in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. However,
thereafter, the implementation of sanctions was vetoed by Russia and China in the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). On the one hand, this issue demonstrates the flexibility of
the G8 as a forum of global governance. In the past, the G8 has always been flexible enough
to respond to events as they immediately unfold including various terrorist attacks across the
decades, the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986, the death of North Korean leader Kim Il-
Sung in 1994, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, and conflict in Kosovo in 1999.
However, on the other hand, it also highlights the limits of the G8’s consensus-building and
calls Russia’s membership into question. Signing up in the G8 to an agreed statement on
Zimbabwe that threatens sanctions and then undermining it in the UN raises serious
questions about Russia’s consistency and like-mindedness with the G8 family.
It should not be forgotten that the G8 leaders and especially their sherpas had a (possibly too)
full agenda to discuss. Food security, global health, counter-terrorism, nuclear non-
proliferation, reform of international institutions and the state of the world economy were all
addressed in summit documentation to varying degrees. It may well be the case that the G8 is
attempting to address too much, especially as it only had one day for the core leaders to
address these issues. It is ironic, to say the least, that the state of the world economy was the
issue that led to the original meeting of the G6 in 1975, but at a time of similar (if not worse)
economic dislocation, the G8 failed to address this issue to any significant extent in its
discussions. The decade-old forum of the G20 was later charged with coordinating a
response to the global economic slump at its Washington meeting in November 2008
suggesting that it may become the mechanism of choice in the future instead of the G8.
However, attention at Hokkaido was firmly placed on climate change and Africa – issues that
were never intended to be dealt with by the original summit process.
Beyond the 8?
Nobody was in any doubt that this would be a well-run and well-organised meeting and that
the Japanese government would do its utmost to avoid the humiliation of being responsible
for hosting a failed summit. However, this summit also proved to be a considerable step
forward in addressing the major weakness of the G8 summit process – its lack of legitimacy –
through the best means available: reaching out to other participants.
A number of leaders from other countries were also invited to join this year’s G8 summit for
specific sessions. For some it was their first time to attend the G8, whilst others had
considerable experience of the G8 summit. African participants invited to the first day included
Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (8th summit), Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
(2nd summit), Ghanaian President John Agyekum Kufuor (4th summit), Nigerian President
Umaru Yar’Adua (2nd summit), Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade (7th summit), South
African President Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki (9th summit), Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho
Kikwete (1st summit), and Chair of the Commission of the African Union Jean Ping, alongside
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and World Bank President Robert Zoellick to discuss
African development including food security, water, health and education. As regards the
‘Outreach Five’ leading developing countries who were invited to the third day of the summit,
Chinese President Hu Jintao (5th summit), Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (4th
summit), Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (5th summit), Mexican President Felipe
de Jesús Calderón Hinojosa (2nd summit) and South African President Mbeki were in
attendance. Other invitees to the final day included Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd,
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and South Korean President Lee Myung-
bak, all attending for the first time.
Should More Egos be Invited?
It should not be forgotten that one of the few ways in which the G8 can accrue some much-
needed legitimacy is through this process of ‘outreach’. In short, this year’s summit was the
most representative G8 summit in history and a substantial step as part of the ‘outreach’
initiative of which Japan has been an innovator in the past. Going back to the previous
occasion upon which Japan hosted the G8 summit in Okinawa in 2000, Prime Minister Mori
invited a number of NGO representatives and African leaders, specifically South African
Prime Minister Thabo Mbeki (as chair of the Non-Aligned Movement), Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo (as chair of the Group of 77 developing countries), and Algerian
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (as representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)).
It is clear that expansion of the G8 – for so long discussed – is now firmly on the agenda.
Noises were being made in Hokkaido that the Italian Prime Minister, the host of next year’s
summit, had been impressed by the arrangements for this year’s summit and would continue
with a similar format in the summer of 2009. However, the overriding question is whether
many of these countries are actually interested in joining an expanded G9, G13, G20 (or
whatever the suffix may be), let alone be willing to travel long distances at considerable
expense to attend a short breakfast meeting? Ultimately, will expansion damage the informal
nature of the summit process and simply result in another UN and further institutional
overlap?
Outreach has been manifest not only in terms of inviting other countries but also as regards
engagement with civil society (sometimes described by the patronising term ‘downreach’).
Unlike the 2000 Okinawa Summit, there was no construction of an NGO centre this time,
possibly as a result of controversy over MOFA’s efforts last time that smacked of surveillance
rather than facilitating civil society participation in the summit. This time, one hundred press
passes were given to fifty NGOs selected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they were
given their own dedicated space in the media centre in Rusutsu. Fukuda also met with a
number of NGO representatives on 19 June 2008 for a 90-minute meeting ahead of the
summit, which was praised by a number of NGO representatives. This year Japanese NGOs
were organised under the umbrella of the 2008 Japan G8 Summit NGO Forum formed in
January 2007 under the chair of Hoshino Masako. The local government also provided a
number of facilities for NGOs and included them from an early stage in the preparations for
the summit.
However, the reaction of civil society to the summit agreements was largely negative. As
regards the planning of the summit, there were criticisms of the withdrawal of visa and refusal
to grant activists entry to Japan. As regards the centrepiece issue of climate change,
environmental NGO Kiko Nettowaku echoed a number of other groups by criticising the lack
of concrete mid-term goals and cooperation of developing countries, and as regards the long-
term goal of 50 per cent reductions by 2050, highlighting that it was only the US that had
shifted its position since Heiligendamm the previous year; the positions of the other
summiteers had not changed. Finally, as regards aid and development, there was criticism of
the poor treatment of the subject by the summiteers. However, despite clear dissatisfaction
with the summit declarations, as regards the participation of civil society in this year’s summit,
there was a sense expressed by representatives of the 2008 Japan G8 Summit NGO Forum
that this year’s activities were part of a learning process and could provide a solid foundation
for future action. Again, in short, something of a curate’s egg.
The G8 in Japan’s Foreign Policy
The G8 functions within Japan’s foreign policy as a forum for the promotion of its national
interests simultaneously on a regional, bilateral and unilateral basis, in addition to the
multilateral level discussed above.
On the regional level, the Japanese government has cherished its role as a self-appointed
and sole representative of Asia (Ajia no Daihyo). This goes back to the first summit at
Rambouillet and has been a continuous theme since then, manifested both in the agenda
items the Japanese government brings to the attention of the Western summiteers after
regularly conducting tours of the region to sound out its neighbours and its attempts to foster
the participation of fellow Asian countries in the summit. Preparations for this year started
early when Finance Minister Nukaga Fukushiro visited India and Vietnam in January 2008.
However, at this year’s summit, this role was played out more in terms of membership than
agenda items and very few issues related solely to Asia found their way into the G8’s
discussions. Instead, the Japanese government as host was successful in inviting three
leaders from the East Asian region (broadly defined) to participate in discussions on the third
day of the summit focused on the environment: South Korean President Lee Myung Bak,
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Australian Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd. For each of these leaders, it was the first time to participate in the summit process. In
addition, the leaders of China and India participated in the summit as part of the enlarged
dialogue with the ‘Outreach Five’, again on the final day of the summit. Both these leaders
have participated in a number of enlarged dialogue meetings with the G8 leaders at previous
G8 summits.
As regards South Korea, the Japanese prime minister had in the past visited or talked to his
South Korean counterpart ahead of and/or before the summit, but this was the extent of his
access to the summit table prior to this year’s summit. In the case of Indonesia, this was the
realisation of a previously failed attempt to invited President Suharto to the 1993 Tokyo
Summit. On that occasion, despite its best efforts, the Japanese government was
unsuccessful in securing the agreement of the fellow summiteers to Indonesia’s participation.
In the end, Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi did arrange a bilateral meeting between Suharto
and President Bill Clinton on the periphery of the summit. Finally, in the case of Australia, this
was once again the realisation of a long-held ambition: the Japanese government had
attempted to include the Australians within the original meeting of the G6 in November 1975
at Rambouillet. It appears to be its position as the only Asian summit nation and its self-
perception as a representative of the region that motivates the Japanese government in
extending invitations.
However, the Japanese government’s position as the sole representative of the East Asian
region in the G8 also shapes its attitude towards the most-touted future member of an
expanded G8: China. As discussed above, the expansion of the G8 has been receiving
increased attention over the years and appears now to be squarely on the table after Japan
hosted the most representative summit in history. Despite these efforts, the Japanese
government is still wary of allowing China in as a regular member and its opposition to
China’s inclusion is based on similar reasons that fuelled its opposition to Russian
membership in the 1990s: unresolved bilateral issues and a strong belief that the G8’s sense
of cohesion built on democratic and capitalist principles would be eroded. No doubt, the
Japanese government would also wish to avoid allowing a rival for the position of Asia’s
representative into the G8, especially whilst it is still excluded from the UNSC.
As regards the bilateral level, the G8 affords the opportunity for a number of bilateral meetings
to take place on the edges of the summit. In the past, the Japanese prime minister has taken
the opportunity to meet with a number of his counterparts and maintain Japan’s key bilateral
relationships. This has been of particular importance in handling the relationship with the US
whether it be the resolution of trade disputes (the 1988 Toronto Summit for example) or
discussion of the position of US bases within Japan (the 2000 Okinawa Summit). As host,
Prime Minister Fukuda had a busy schedule of bilateral meetings including Canadian Prime
Minister Stephen Harper and US President George W. Bush on 6 July. He then met with
Nigerian President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, South
African President Thabo Mbeki, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UK Prime Minister
Gordon Brown all on 7 July 2008. Fukuda met with Russian President Medvedev for the first
time on the evening of the following day, and finally he met with Indonesian President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono on the evening of 9 July 2008.
Obviously the most important of these meetings was with Bush and it allowed the two leaders
to reassert the strength of the two countries’ alliance and discuss North Korea: both the
abduction issue and the US removal of North Korea from the list of terrorist-supporting states.
The two issues were linked in Bush’s attempts to reassure Fukuda that the US would support
Japan over the abduction issue despite concerns in Japan that its ally was going soft on
North Korea by removing the label of a terrorist-supporting state. In addition, the meeting
provided Fukuda with an opportunity to increase the pressure on Bush to accept the 50 per
cent cut in emissions by 2050 ahead of the opening of the summit. Also of importance was the
meeting with Medvedev. Although this was their first meeting, it was conducted on a first-
name basis and as well as addressing a range of bilateral issues led to another in a long line
of joint declarations over the years that the two governments would seek to resolve the
Northern Territories territorial issue in an attempt to improve bilateral relations. The fact that
the summit was being held in Hokkaido was not ignored.
On the unilateral level, the Japanese government has used the G8 summit in the past to
promote its national interests by placing issues of concern on the agenda and lobbying to
have statements of support included in the final declarations. For example, as the Cold War
came to an end, the Japanese government managed to ensure that the communiqués
released at three consecutive summits (Houston in 1990, London in 1991 and Munich in
1992) expressed support for Japan in the resolution of the territorial dispute with the Soviet
Union/Russia over the Northern Territories. However, this strategy of instrumentalising a
multilateral forum like the G8 to promote Japan’s national interest on a bilateral issue proved
to be completely unsuccessful in moving the issue toward resolution. Nevertheless, the
Japanese government continued to use a similar strategy at this year’s summit. The G8 took
the opportunity to reaffirm its position towards North Korea and expressed support for the
resolution of the abduction issue (rachi mondai) in its Statement on Political Issues:
We are committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic
means. We express our continuous support for the Six-Party process towards
the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the eventual
normalization of relations between the relevant Six-Party members through the
full implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, including the
resolution of the outstanding issues of concern such as the abduction issue.
Some journalists reported this as the first time for the issue to appear in the documentation
emanating from a G8 summit. However, in reality, this was the sixth summit in a row for the G8
to call for the early and/or peaceful resolution of the abduction issue either in the Chair’s
Summary or as part of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting since its first appearance in G8
documentation at the 2003 Evian Summit. Looking back to the Northern Territories dispute,
historical precedent appears to suggest that this strategy will have extremely limited results.
Domestic Reception
For the most part, approval ratings for the Fukuda administration were in steady decline
throughout most of 2008 and only began to show signs of bottoming out during the summer
once the G8 summit was over, but too late to prevent his resignation at the beginning of
September. Thus, it was only to be expected that the G8 summit would become embroiled in
the wranglings over his future: there were expectations that he would try to score a success at
the G8 summit to boost his domestic standing, predictions that a Lower House election might
be called after the summit, and even doubts as to whether he would be around to host the
summit.
Although the strategy of basking in the reflected glory of a successful summit has been seen
to work for numerous past G8 leaders and Japanese prime ministers – Nakasone at
Williamsburg in 1983 and Venice in 1987 and Kaifu at Houston in 1990 providing some
examples of positive shifts in opinion polls – it is difficult to pinpoint the G8 summit as a
specific factor in the changes in approval ratings. Generally, unpopular prime ministers
continue to be unpopular and popular prime ministers continue to be popular. However, prime
ministers are rarely deterred from attempting to instrumentalise the summit for scoring points
at home.
Regardless of whether this was Fukuda’s strategy or not, the summit predictably appeared to
have little effect on an already deeply unpopular leader. According to an opinion poll
conducted by the Asahi Shinbun immediately after the summit and published on 15 July,
Fukuda’s cabinet commanded an approval rating of 24 per cent, an increase of 1 per cent
from the previous month’s poll, and a disapproval rating of 58 per cent, a decrease also of 1
per cent. Specifically as regards his performance at the summit, 24 per cent believed that he
had demonstrated leadership, as opposed to 60 per cent who disagreed. 32 per cent of
pollees rated the G8’s treatment of climate change, whereas 60 per cent did not. Thus, a
distinct lack of leadership was perceived and any results that may have emerged from the
summit were unlikely to be credited to Fukuda. Subsequently there was a slight rise in
Fukuda’s approval ratings according to some polls but it occurred after the G8 summit had
passed from people’s memories and was likely to be a result of different factors. In any case,
this did not forestall his resignation.
Hanging on Fukuda’s Every Word
The reaction of civil society was touched upon above and is explored in more detail in the
other articles that make up this special edition. As regards the reaction of the Japanese
business world to the summit, Nippon Keidanren did organise a summit meeting prior to the
leaders’ meeting on 17 April 2008 in Tokyo that discussed the connection between climate
change and innovative technology, promoted the lowering of trade barriers to environmental
goods and services and called on the G8 to adopt a sectoral approach to carbon emissions.
Thus, it came as no great surprise that a number of Japanese newspapers reported after the
summit that Nippon Keidanren’s Chairman Mitarai Fujio’s reaction to the 2050 target of 50 per
cent cuts, the G8’s recognition of the sectoral approach and the role of innovative technology
was largely positive and Fukuda’s leadership was singled out for praise. However, Keizai
Doyukai’s Chairman Sakurai Masamitsu was more critical, expressing regret over the lack of
progressive results and arguing that the summit should contribute to progress in international
discussions and address the introduction of incentives and the establishment of mid-term
targets. Although the business world has tended to speak with one voice in reaction to
previous summits and not have such divergent reactions, there have been other occasions
when Keizai DoyÅ«kai has been more critical of the Japanese government and G8 summit
process than Keidanren.
Conclusions
The most commonly asked question immediately after the summit was whether it had been a
success or a failure. However, this question is symptomatic of a popular attitude to the summit
that demands quick fixes. The nature of the G8 demands that a few years pass before the
question can be revisited in a meaningful way and in the meantime various international
NGOs and the G8 Research Centre at the University of Toronto will continue to track
compliance and seek to hold the G8 leaders accountable for the fulfilment of their promises.
The best that can be said at this stage is that is that the results were mixed. Toyako was not
as successful as some summits (Rambouillet in 1975 or Bonn in 1978 for example) and not
as disastrous as others (San Juan in 1976 or Bonn in 1985). Japan will continue to act as
chair of the G8 until Italy takes over at the beginning of 2009 and already there have been a
series of incremental follow-ups that continue the G8 process but will probably get little media
attention: the framework for action on global health, regular finance ministers’ meetings,
foreign and finance ministers’ statements, and the G8 parliamentarians meeting in Hiroshima.
The Party’s Over for Another Year
However, trouble appears to be brewing, particularly as regards expansion of the G8. Since
the G8 leaders left Hokkaido on 10 July, Russia’s intervention in Georgia has continued to
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confirm fears that it does not share the same principles or subscribe to the same international
norms that are supposed to bind the G8 together and constitute some form of informal criteria
for membership. Both G7 finance and foreign ministers have come together to condemn
Russia’s actions, support Georgia’s sovereignty and promise to rebuild the Georgian
economy. At the same time, how US President-elect Barack Obama chooses to conduct
foreign relations generally and reacts to Russia specifically will be of considerable
importance: his Republican opponent John McCain had advocated stripping Russia of its G8
status well before its intervention in Georgia. It appears that the summit’s most risky
experiment with expansion that began in the 1990s and resulted in the metamorphosis from
G7 to G8 to reflect Russia’s participation may be floundering. Russia’s alienation from its
fellow summiteers is likely to give the core summit members food for thought and stall future
expansion of the G8 for some time, despite the best efforts of the Japanese government to
promote ‘outreach’ at this year’s summit. The greatest threat to the continuance of the G8 in its
present form appears to come from within, rather than from any space monster.
 
Notes
Many thanks are owed to the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee for part-funding my
trip to Japan during the G8 summit, to Peter Hajnal for useful comments and suggestions, and
also to Andy Staples for introducing me to the patois of rock climbers.
Hugo Dobson is a senior lecturer at the National Institute of Japanese Studies and School of
East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield. He is the author of Japan and the G7/8, 1975-
2002 and The Group of 7/8, both published by Routledge. He may be contacted at H.
Dobson@sheffield.ac.uk 
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